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**Africa Review**

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**22 August 1986**

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,*

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## Africa Review

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## Articles

Zimbabwe: Mugabe's  
Mozambican Adventure

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Over the past year, the deteriorating security situation in neighboring Mozambique and Zimbabwe's military involvement there have dominated Harare's regional foreign policy agenda. Prime Minister Mugabe has become embroiled in a seemingly unending commitment in a conflict that is siphoning off scarce resources, eroding military morale and capabilities, and threatening to undermine support for his regime. Despite the Army's near unanimous desire to reduce the size and extent of its role, political and economic realities are likely to require Harare to maintain an extensive—and open ended—military commitment in Mozambique.

**Military Intervention**

Zimbabwean forces were first deployed to Mozambique in late 1982 to protect the Beira transportation corridor—running from the port city of Beira to Mutare in eastern Zimbabwe—against attacks by Mozambican insurgents and South African commandos. In early 1984, Harare assigned a motorized battalion to provide protection for truck convoys traveling along the Tete corridor between Zimbabwe and Malawi. Until mid-1985, Zimbabwean forces in Mozambique—which never exceeded 3,500—limited their activity to providing security along these two transportation corridors. Moreover, the Army apparently had reached a modus vivendi with the guerrillas that kept interruptions on the two routes down to a relatively low level.

Concerned over a deteriorating security situation and spurred on by appeals from Mozambican President Machel for increased military assistance, Mugabe—against the advice of several of his senior Army commanders—in mid-1985 began to increase the number of Zimbabwean troops in central Mozambique. The introduction of several thousand

additional troops enabled Harare to begin undertaking offensive operations against Mozambican insurgents near the Beira corridor.

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by late August 1985, Harare had nearly tripled the number of its troops to more than 9,000 and was spearheading a joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean offensive in the central provinces. Following the end of the government offensive late last year, Harare's forces continued to conduct limited operations. Nevertheless, in late February, Harare again reduced its troop presence and, after a considerable debate among political and military leaders, Army headquarters ordered a cessation of all offensive operations.

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Zimbabwean units remain arrayed in defensive positions along the Beira corridor.

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Despite the Army's success at overrunning insurgent camps and reasserting government control over large areas of central Mozambique, Harare's efforts failed to provide any long-term improvement in the overall security situation. While Zimbabwe's tactical successes did provide the Machel regime with a badly needed boost in morale, the Army failed to inflict heavy casualties on the guerrillas and only temporarily disrupted insurgent activity. Moreover,

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pacification of the central provinces was an elusive objective, given limited Zimbabwean military resources, insurgent strategic flexibility and the dismal performance of the Mozambican Army. After their experience in 1985, we believe Harare's military leaders will favor a strategy aimed at

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defending only that which is vital to Zimbabwean interests—the Beira and Tete corridors—and minimize personnel and equipment losses.

#### **Mugabe's Objectives**

In part, the decision to intervene appeared to be an attempt by Mugabe to repay Machel for Mozambican assistance to Zimbabwean guerrillas during the Rhodesian civil war. More important, in our judgment, the intervention stemmed from a growing concern in Harare over the Mozambican insurgent threat to Zimbabwe's vulnerable transportation and supply lines through Mozambique. The US Embassy reports that, prior to the troop increase last year, a Zimbabwean official said his government was deeply concerned about the severity of the problems facing the Mozambican Government. Moreover, security along the Beira corridor last May was deteriorating and the Army was reporting increasing concentrations of insurgents in the area,

Zimbabwe has attempted for several years—without much success—to lessen its dependence on the South African transportation network.

a government study in May 1985—prior to the troop increase—concluded that Zimbabwe was relying increasingly on the South African transportation system to move exports and imports, and only 16 percent of the country's surface traffic was not subject to Pretoria's control. Recent US Embassy reporting indicates that over 3 million tons per year are carried by South African railroads alone.

Harare's need to secure alternative transportation routes has now become paramount in the midst of Mugabe's campaign to garner support for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa and Pretoria's threat to counter with its own sanctions against its neighbors. If South Africa were to retaliate, Zimbabwe would be left with no economically viable alternative except to make extensive use of Mozambique's decaying and highly vulnerable transportation network.<sup>1</sup> Following his

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#### ***The Beira Corridor***

*The Beira transportation corridor—consisting of a rail line, paved two-lane road, and an oil pipeline—extends from Mutare, in eastern Zimbabwe, to the Mozambican port of Beira, on the Indian Ocean. It is the shortest and potentially cheapest outlet to the sea for central Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, and southern Malawi. For most of these countries, the only feasible alternatives to the Beira corridor are the longer, more costly, and politically vulnerable routes through South Africa. Nonetheless, the Beira route is underutilized because of poor management, infrastructure deterioration, and intermittent sabotage by Mozambican insurgents.*

*The Southern African Development Coordination Conference, formed in the early 1980s by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to coordinate economic development and lessen dependence on South Africa, considers restoration and expansion of the Beira corridor to be its most urgent program. The group has secured initial funding from countries and multilateral banks in the West, Scandinavia, and the Middle East.*

*Representatives of the group predicted in mid-July that completion of the first phase of a 10-year plan will enable the Beira corridor to carry 50 percent of the trade of the nine member countries that now transits South Africa by the end of 1986. Officials of the group estimate the initial cost of these improvements at between \$265 and \$421 million, and US officials say the entire 10-year program will cost more than \$600 million.*

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return from the mini-Commonwealth summit on South African sanctions, Mugabe stressed the need for securing and opening transportation routes through Mozambique, according to the US Embassy.

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**Secret****Zimbabwean Military in Mozambique****Mozambican Morass**

Harare, through a series of ad hoc political decisions over several years, has steadily expanded its commitment in Mozambique. Last summer's infusion of over 6,000 additional troops and their active participation in large-scale offensive operations, however, marked a major escalation in Zimbabwean involvement. We believe Harare has embarked on a course of action that it will find increasingly costly and difficult to reverse. [REDACTED]

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After devoting nearly four years, as well as extensive manpower and material resources, to assist the faltering Machel regime and secure vital transportation and supply lines through Mozambique, Harare has little to show for its effort. More important, the Zimbabwean military is beset by a growing host of problems:

- The Army in 1985 estimated the cost of maintaining troops in Mozambique at about \$15 million a month, and the 1986 defense budget increased by 26 percent over last year.
- Late last fall, the US defense attache reported equipment losses were draining Army resources at an alarming rate.
- Although Harare's military has suffered relatively light casualties, both the Army and Air Force have lost skilled—and irreplaceable—field commanders.
- Harare is facing increasing morale problems among troops deployed in Mozambique. Air Force pilots have refused to fly supplies to forward Army positions, marijuana usage is widespread, and many Zimbabweans believe they are dying for a lost cause [REDACTED]
- There is a lack of cooperation and mistrust between the Mozambican and the Zimbabwean Armies. Moreover, [REDACTED] the local populace is increasingly hostile to the Zimbabwean Army presence. [REDACTED]

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Not only has Mugabe involved his military in an unpopular and costly external conflict, but also the Army is frustrated in fighting a guerrilla force that it cannot defeat and is bogged down in a war it cannot avoid. [ ]

### Desperately Seeking Solutions

Harare, aware of its limited ability to redress the security situation, is attempting to find new methods to help the Mozambican Government increase its military and political effectiveness. [ ]

[ ] in order for Harare's military to meet its commitment, Mozambican Army weaknesses had to be corrected immediately. The Mozambican military has been repeatedly criticized by Harare for its inadequate training, shortages of supplies, poor morale, and lack of organization. In an effort to address some of these shortcomings, Harare is sending several Army training teams to Mozambique to teach basic training, drill, and small unit tactics, [ ]

[ ] In addition, Zimbabwe's Ambassador to Mozambique recently said that Harare was preparing to increase logistic support to the Mozambican Army, according to the US Embassy. [ ]

Harare appears to be encouraging Maputo to take steps to regain popular support it has lost to the insurgents. To assist the regime, Zimbabwe reportedly was considering supplying surplus food, clothing, and consumer goods to the local population. [ ]

earlier this summer press reports indicated Mugabe was encouraging Machel to renew talks with guerrilla leaders. [ ]

### Outlook

The Zimbabwean Army's presence in Mozambique will continue to sap scarce financial resources, deplete equipment stockpiles, and lay the foundation for permanently politicizing the country's military leadership. With little chance of victory on the battlefield, Army officers and men are likely to become increasingly angry at decisions that are slowly but steadily destroying the military's capabilities. Despite the growing unpopularity of the Zimbabwean presence, no political or military leaders are yet willing to challenge Mugabe directly. [ ]

As the movement to impose comprehensive sanctions on South Africa gains momentum, Harare will become more dependent on Mozambique for alternative transportation routes. In the event of South African countersanctions, Zimbabwe would be forced—over the likely protest of the Army—to once again increase its involvement in Mozambique. Pretoria's military considers it essential to interdict or reduce traffic through the Beira corridor in order for countermeasures against Zimbabwe and other neighboring states to be effective. [ ]

[ ] In our judgment, Harare cannot secure the Beira and Tete corridors if South Africa resumes full support to the insurgents and directs them to attack the route, or sends commandos to sabotage key installations there. [ ]

The longer the Zimbabwean Army remains in Mozambique, the greater the likelihood Harare will turn to Moscow as a supplier of badly needed military aid. Although Mugabe would be reluctant, in our view, to enter into a major arms relationship with the Soviets, a rapidly declining security situation in Mozambique, continued poor relations between Harare and the West, and hard-hitting South African countersanctions may, in the long term, force him to seek large-scale Soviet assistance. [ ]



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## Zimbabwe: The Nonaligned Summit

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The harshly anti-US tone of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) ministerial meeting in New Delhi last April suggests that the level of anti-US rhetoric at the summit, scheduled for 26 August to 7 September in Harare, will probably exceed that of previous summits. The Soviets almost certainly will not be disappointed with NAM rhetoric on key issues such as South Africa, disarmament, and LDC debt, and are well placed in Zimbabwe to propagandize debates and resolutions critical of the United States. Prime Minister Mugabe's assumption of the NAM chairmanship probably will accelerate Zimbabwean acceptance and advocacy of radical positions on international issues, and is likely to contribute to the deterioration of US-Zimbabwean relations.

### Background

Approximately 5,000 to 7,000 people, including 50 to 60 heads of state, will converge in Harare for the NAM summit. Mugabe succeeds India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Harare was persuaded by Havana last year to accept the NAM chairmanship, giving Zimbabwe only 16 months to prepare for the meeting. Mugabe probably believed the chairmanship would enhance his credentials as a Third World leader, establish Zimbabwe as a key country among the Frontline States, and focus greater world attention on southern Africa.

As host of the summit, Zimbabwe was responsible for authoring a working document for the meeting that was circulated in New York in early August. Mugabe also will be the spokesperson for the NAM for the next three years, and Zimbabwe's Permanent Mission to the United Nations will head the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau in New York.

### Hosting the Summit

Zimbabwe's financial difficulties in hosting the conference make it vulnerable to pressure from radical NAM members. The \$40 million reportedly budgeted for the summit represents a substantial strain on an economy facing slow economic growth

(2 to 3 percent), a large budget deficit (more than 10 percent of GDP), and inflation projected to reach 20 percent this year. To limit the strain, Zimbabwe has accepted contributions from other countries. In our view, Harare's ineptitude in negotiating deals with a number of potential contributors has allowed more committed radical members—most notably Cuba—to provide desperately needed services and equipment for the summit.

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Cuba's past record in the NAM suggests that it will exploit this position to good effect, although Havana may be operating under financial constraints. Mugabe is wary of Cuban motives, but, we believe that he overestimates his ability to keep radical members like Cuba in check.

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### Key Issues on the Agenda

A review of the summit draft communique, written by the Zimbabwean UN Mission, and an analysis of the results of the ministerial meeting in April indicate that southern Africa, disarmament, and LDC economic problems will get high priority at the summit:

- *Southern Africa.* The heads of state will call for complete eradication of apartheid and for mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against Pretoria. They may also call for a UN Security Council meeting to focus on South Africa and Namibia. The United States will be criticized for aiding and abetting apartheid through its policy of constructive engagement and condemned for helping to build South Africa's nuclear capability, abusing its veto power in the UN Security Council, and giving aid to UNITA. There are indications that some members may push the idea that the US attack on Libya created the atmosphere for recent South African attacks on Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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• *Disarmament.* The summit will endorse the arms-control initiative of the Group of Six—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania—for a US-Soviet test ban with the Group of Six providing verification assistance. While the draft communique does not contain language from the New Delhi ministerial welcoming the “timely program for disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union,” it does call for the United States to join the Soviet nuclear test moratorium and urges Washington to reconsider its decision on the SALT accords.

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• *LDC economic troubles.* While the economic portion of the draft communique is not yet available, we believe reenergizing the Nonaligned approach to global economic problems—particularly LDC debt and the New International Economic Order—will be an important agenda item. While some NAM members oppose the proposal because of fears it will split the Group of 77, India is seeking the establishment of a standing committee on economic issues whose function would be to create a NAM position vis-a-vis international economic conferences and organizations.

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Two other agenda items, the Iran-Iraq war and selection of a NAM chairman for 1989, promise to be contentious issues:

- *Iran-Iraq war.* The NAM has been unable to mediate between the two warring members, and, after heated debate, probably will agree to only a generic statement calling for the cessation of hostilities.
- *NAM chairman.* Only two members, Nicaragua and Indonesia, have formally announced candidacy, although Peru is lobbying behind the scenes for support. Most members believe it is Latin America's

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turn to assume the chairmanship, leaving Indonesia at a disadvantage. Nicaragua, with Cuban support, is lobbying hard and has sent envoys to several countries and to the OAU summit held recently. Despite Nicaragua's recent diplomatic efforts, we believe Peru is a more likely choice. In our judgment, should there be difficulty in reaching a consensus for Peru, Yugoslavia could be a compromise choice. [ ]

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#### **Soviet Exploitation of the Harare Meeting**

The Soviets almost certainly will not be disappointed with NAM rhetoric on southern Africa and disarmament, as their views are similar to those of many of the Nonaligned members. On topics that the Soviets are vulnerable to criticism, such as Afghanistan, Moscow has been maneuvering to press its case. We believe, for example, that the Soviets organized the recent visit of an Afghan delegation to Zimbabwe. While the visit apparently did not result in any diplomatic breakthrough or changes in Zimbabwe's views, we expect that Moscow's allies—for example, the Cubans and Nicaraguans—will be able to block efforts to single out Moscow for criticism on this and other issues. [ ]

In addition to the support that Moscow can expect from its allies, the Soviet Union, in our view, is positioned to influence and exploit the Harare summit through its own means. [ ]

A review of Third World and Soviet press coverage on the summit reflects a Moscow-orchestrated disinformation campaign alleging US attempts to sabotage the summit, US-South African military cooperation, and US attempts to destroy NAM unity. Soviet disinformation efforts, including media play and probable involvement in disseminating anti-US forgeries, are designed to reinforce and heighten already strident anti-US sentiment within the NAM. Moscow's tactic is likely to be successful because moderate NAM members are unlikely to refute allegations publicly during the summit for fear of being labeled as US surrogates. Moreover, the Soviet allegations reinforce existing African and Third World perceptions on many key issues, most notably alleged US cooperation with South Africa. Uncontested, these allegations will circulate at the meeting and may worsen anti-US name-calling in the summit's proceedings and final communique. The anti-US tone will probably carry forward into proposed Third World resolutions during this fall's UN General Assembly, where NAM members constitute a majority. [ ]

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#### **Implications for the United States**

In our judgment, Zimbabwe's anti-Western criticism will probably become increasingly strident after Mugabe assumes the chairmanship of the NAM and draws closer to so-called Third World progressives, thus placing an additional strain on already poor relations between Washington and Harare. Although Mugabe still appears to desire amicable relations with the United States because of the importance of US assistance—more than \$360 million since 1980—to Zimbabwe's economic success, Harare will continue to guard jealously its own version of nonalignment. Efforts by US officials to persuade Mugabe to adopt a

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more balanced approach are likely to be viewed as unwarranted interference in the NAM's affairs and largely disregarded. [REDACTED]

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Zimbabwe, as NAM chairman, is likely to find itself increasingly at odds with US foreign policy goals in Africa and the Third World. Mugabe will undoubtedly step up his denunciation of US policies in southern Africa, which he sees as tacit support for the South African Government. He probably also will become more vocal in his criticism of US policies in Central America, and in Nicaragua in particular. Moreover, as Zimbabwe's verbal attacks against the United States and the West escalate and alienate Western governments, Moscow's access is likely to grow, providing new opportunities for Soviet meddling in southern Africa. [REDACTED]

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**Senegal: Dissatisfaction Among  
Islamic Brotherhoods**

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Growing tensions between the government of President Diouf and the Islamic brotherhoods<sup>1</sup> recently erupted in a clash between police and members of the Mouride Brotherhood in their religious capital city of Touba. The brotherhoods have grown increasingly unhappy with government policies that have hurt them economically, and have begun voicing their opposition. Despite this, we believe the government will continue to implement its economic reform programs, at least in the near term.

agricultural reforms.<sup>2</sup> The Tidjaniya also are worried that stricter government controls on customs and transport will cut into their revenues.

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Moreover, last month the government undertook a campaign of closing unauthorized stalls in a Dakar market, many of which belonged to Mouride businessmen.

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**Killing Highlights Problems**

In July members of the Mouride Brotherhood killed a man, later discovered to be a soldier, who they believed was attacking their imam—the second most important leader in the brotherhood—

The brotherhoods recently have become more vocal in their protests of government policies. In July the Tidjani Khalif General—the organizational leader—addressed a crowd of about 6,000 and called some of Diouf's policies a threat to Islam in Senegal,

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. He also called on Senegalese Muslims to work together to prevent the erosion of their power by government authorities,

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Despite these differences, both sides appear anxious to avoid a more serious confrontation.

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Diouf and the Mouride Khalif General agreed that any problems between the government and the brotherhood could be worked out amicably. In late July the Tidjani Khalif General met with the Ministers of Interior and Labor to try to ease the negative effects of some government policies on the brotherhood.

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The brotherhoods are also unhappy because they believe their economic interests are being hurt by IMF-sponsored austerity measures.

there is widespread dissatisfaction among the Tidjani Brotherhood over the measures—which include a tightening of domestic credit, more vigorous collection of outstanding loans, and

<sup>1</sup> There are four brotherhoods in Senegal. The two most important are the Tidjani and Mouride, which together claim the loyalty of about 44 percent of the population.

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**Outlook**

We believe the government will try to avert a confrontation over the prosecution of the brotherhood members involved in the Touba killing to avoid provoking more open dissent from the brotherhoods.

[redacted] some Mouride leaders are concerned they would be forced to decide between protecting those involved, or obeying Senegalese law if the government decides to prosecute the case. We believe the Mourides would try to protect their members, but without appearing openly defiant of Dakar, perhaps by sending those involved out of the country. [redacted]

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In our judgment, Dakar will proceed with economic reforms despite the objections of the brotherhoods, at least in the near term. Diouf will probably continue to rely on mutually profitable ties to keep brotherhood opposition from getting out of hand. Nevertheless, in our judgment, the brotherhoods will continue to pressure the government to back off from the reforms, and probably will become increasingly open in their opposition. [redacted]

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### Equatorial Guinea-Gabon: Increased South African Presence

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Equatorial Guinea has permitted the South Africans to enter the country to complete two development projects, [redacted] southeastern Gabon confirms South African construction activity, [redacted]. A more obvious South African presence in Equatorial Guinea probably reflects President Obiang's willingness to accept foreign assistance from any donor, despite public rhetoric against Pretoria's apartheid policies. President Bongo of Gabon probably hopes to maintain a neutral position regarding South Africa because of his country's proximity to Angola and Cabinda, and his hopes of eventually playing a role in negotiating a solution to the Angola conflict. [redacted]

#### Equatorial Guinea

In Equatorial Guinea, Pretoria has assisted livestock development on Bioko Island, and constructed small villas in Bata for central African chiefs of state who will attend the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC) conference in December. According to the US Embassy, the South Africans are well liked by the Equatorial Guineans and within Malabo's small international community, and few government officials bother to carry on the traditional official pretense that the South Africans in the country are Swiss, Dutch, or French. For at least two years, the South African Government has attempted to develop a livestock breeding project on Bioko Island in the mountain agricultural region of Moka. Although a South African veterinarian, mechanic, doctor, and project leader have been involved in the project since its inception, the US Embassy notes that they recently have begun to appear frequently in public places in the capital, Malabo. According to US Embassy reporting, rumors abound regarding the South Africans' intention to locate a VHF repeater on Equatorial Guinea's highest peak to permit communication around the island, and that other development assistance may be planned. [redacted]

According to the US Embassy, in late May President Obiang was able to secure South African assistance to resolve his housing shortage for heads of state scheduled to attend the UDEAC conference, and 50 to 70 South African construction workers, mostly blacks and Indians, came to Bata to build small villas near the presidential palace. In July US Embassy personnel witnessed the offloading of farm supplies from a C-130-type South African Airways plane in Malabo, while the Embassy reports six South African engineers and construction experts were also expected to arrive in July to supervise road construction. [redacted]

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#### Gabon

[redacted] the airfield at Leconi, in southeastern Gabon, reveals a water tower unique to South African military facilities. Construction activity at the airfield, including a hangar and support facilities, and lengthening of the runway to more than 2,000 meters—long enough to accommodate most aircraft in the South African Air Force inventory. The airfield is situated in a remote, sparsely populated region—reportedly the ancestral homeland of President Bongo—with no known economic potential or security problems. It is located approximately 100 kilometers east of Franceville Airfield, where Gabon has allowed South African commercial aircraft to transit en route to Europe for many years. [redacted]

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Although Bongo has endorsed Western sanctions against Pretoria, he clearly wants to remain independent of any radical initiatives. At the recent Organization of African Unity summit meeting in Addis Ababa, Bongo downplayed the suggestion that a pan-African military force be created to combat apartheid, and opposed measures against the United Kingdom for its opposition to sanctions on South Africa, according to US Embassy reporting. We believe both moves highlight Libreville's desire to

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maintain smooth relations with South Africa, to play a moderating role in African forums, and to remain a viable broker for obtaining a solution to the Angolan conflict. [ ]

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**Outlook and Regional Implications**

Over the last several years, Malabo has repeatedly demonstrated its determination to accept aid from both East and West, discounting ideological differences to secure credits, cash, and resident advisers. Despite official denunciations of apartheid, the same appears true for aid from South Africa. Pretoria has expanded its role significantly at a time when other bilateral donors are demurring from supporting President Obiang's often grandiose schemes for the UDEAC conference. Malabo has supported US attempts in the United Nations to delete name-calling from South African resolutions, a move we believe was aimed at securing additional South African assistance. [ ]

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In Gabon, although information remains sketchy, the proximity of the airstrip to Angola suggests that South Africa may be developing it as a contingency airfield to support UNITA operations in Cabinda and other parts of Angola. Bongo may hope to gain increased aid or a possible mediating role in the Angola conflict in exchange for allowing South African access to Gabonese territory. As a result, we expect he will continue to attempt to moderate African initiatives against apartheid and to maintain good relations with Pretoria. [ ]

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## Guinea-Bissau: Vieira on a Tightrope

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President Vieira, who has moderated his radical rhetoric in the past few years in an effort to secure greater Western economic aid, faces mounting pressure from regime hardliners who favor stronger ties to Moscow. Moreover, the execution in July of former Vice President Correia and five other coup plotters is likely to fuel tribal animosities, US Embassy reporting indicates. Although we have no current evidence of coup plotting, Vieira may be toppled if he loses the support of Defense Minister Camara—widely regarded as the second most powerful government figure, or if pro-Soviet officers believe that he has moved the country too far toward the West. [ ]

### Pressures From Regime Hardliners

Vieira is increasingly concerned that pro-Soviet officials, angered by his overtures to the West, may oust him. [ ] the officials seek an expansion of the Soviet presence in the country and are pressing him to allow the Soviets naval access. Although we cannot easily estimate the size of the pro-Soviet faction, US Embassy reporting indicates many Bissauan officials, especially those who participated in the independence struggle against Portugal, still feel indebted to the Soviets for their support. A review of US Embassy reporting indicates that the two most prominent pro-Soviet officials are Justice Minister Vasco Cabral and Minister of Northern Region Mario Cabral. Vasco Cabral, who frequently travels to Moscow and reportedly has links to the Portuguese Communist Party, has long argued against the limited move toward the West. We note, however, that neither man directly commands troops and would have to rely on pro-Soviet Army officers to act on their behalf. [ ]

### Tribal Tensions

US Embassy reporting indicates that the execution in July of Correia—a leader of the Balante tribe, which makes up about one-third of the population and dominates the Army rank and file—is likely to

further tribal divisions<sup>1</sup> and erode Vieira's limited popular support. The execution of Correia for his involvement in a coup plot last November leaves the Balante tribe without representation in either senior civilian or military positions, and the Embassy reports that, over the last few months, Balante farmers have refused to sell their crops to the government. The Embassy also observes that some Balante youths are joining the Yanque-Yanque cult, which emphasizes traditional animistic behavior and beliefs. Although it is not a political movement, the government has arrested some of its members, fearing that it will become a tribally based, antiregime organization. [ ]

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### Continuing Economic Decline

Vieira has failed to halt Guinea-Bissau's economic decline, despite limited austerity measures imposed since 1983. According to the US Embassy and press reports, economic problems include rice shortages, an overvalued currency, a thriving black market, and a mounting external foreign debt that now totals some \$190 million. Moreover, there is massive smuggling of peanuts and rice—two key crops—into neighboring Senegal, where higher prices are available. Although Guinea-Bissau has potentially lucrative offshore oil, the regime has failed to attract the foreign capital necessary to exploit the deposits. [ ]

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Bissau has failed to implement the reforms necessary to secure an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. According to the US Embassy [ ], the Vieira regime has paid only lipservice to the suggested adjustments. Our Embassy speculates that the government is unwilling or politically unable to increase producer prices substantially, cut public

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<sup>1</sup> According to US Embassy reporting, some 30 percent of Guinea-Bissau's population is Balante; 20 percent, Fulani; 14 percent, Mandingo; and 13 percent, Malinke. Vieira is a member of the Papel tribe, which makes up about 7 percent of the population. [ ]

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**President Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira**

*Vieira, 47, is regarded by US Embassy sources as the genuine hero of the independence struggle from Portugal, in which he personally commanded several key military operations. As Prime Minister from 1978 until 1980, however, he failed to take hold of the reins of government firmly, and frequently disagreed with then President Luis Cabral. He launched his coup in 1980 primarily because a newly implemented constitution permitted Cape Verdeans to have too much access to senior positions. US Embassy sources report he is effective at playing factions against one another. An electrician by training,*

*He has had considerable contact with the Communist countries, receiving military training in China in 1961, studying in Cuba from 1976 to 1977, and visiting the Soviet Union on several occasions.*

salaries, and devalue the currency. International economists also note that Vieira increased the size of the bureaucracy and raised government wages earlier this year.

**Courting the West**

Guinea-Bissau's precarious economic situation has prompted Vieira to court the West in an effort to secure greater financial assistance. In the past two years, he has visited Portugal, France, and

Luxembourg in search of increased aid, but appears to have received only token responses. Paris—which provided \$4 million in economic aid last year—has commercial investment in the country's bauxite and phosphate industries, but is not expected to increase its aid substantially. US Embassy reporting indicates Vieira expects his country to enter the French franc zone by 1990 and to replace the moribund peso with the CFA franc.

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In the past two years, Vieira has become increasingly critical of the USSR. He publicly called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the first time he has openly disapproved of Moscow's behavior. According to US Embassy officials, the government is increasingly frustrated with its fishing agreement with Moscow that has so far proved unprofitable. According to US Embassy estimates, Guinea-Bissau receives less than 4 percent of the valued catch, and Vieira laments his government's inability to patrol Bissau's territorial waters.

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**Possible Soviet and Cuban Pressures**

The Soviets and Cubans, who have considerable influence in the 6,000-man armed forces, may try to undermine Vieira's position should they conclude he no longer serves their interests. The US Embassy notes that every Army officer has been trained by Cuba or the Soviet Union, and that Soviet advisers are placed throughout the high command, while the Cubans carefully monitor the enlisted ranks. We have no precise figures on their presence, but the US Embassy estimates some 250 to 350 Soviet civilian and military advisers and about 140 Cuban military and 100 civilian advisers are based in Bissau. Over the past few years, the USSR has unsuccessfully asked Vieira for access to naval facilities in Bissau, according to US Embassy reporting, and we suspect Moscow will urge pro-Soviet officials to intercede on its behalf.

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**Defense Minister Camara**

his current relationship with Vieira, but past US Embassy reporting suggests he supports the President's limited move toward the West. General Vieira, Army Chief of Staff and a distant cousin of the President, serves as acting commander of the key mechanized brigade based near the capital. We have no information on his loyalty to the President or his ideological leanings. [redacted]

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*Ifai Camara, the Second Vice President and Defense Minister, is the second most powerful official in Guinea-Bissau. Camara commanded the armored battalion that seized the capital for Vieira during the 1980 coup, and he is said to command the full loyalty of his troops. US Embassy sources report the 41-year-old Camara is a "clever politician" who appears to support Vieira's limited move toward the West cautiously.* [redacted]

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*Camara dislikes the Soviets for denigrating nationalism and refusing to provide food aid. Camara is functionally illiterate, according to US Embassy sources.* [redacted]

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**Will Vieira Survive?**

Vieira is likely to come under fire in the coming months from pro-Soviet ministers and Army officers who believe they can capitalize on his isolation. He is also likely to face pressures from disgruntled Balante tribesmen, angered by their lack of representation in the upper echelons of the government and armed forces. Moreover, Vieira's failure to stem Guinea-Bissau's economic decline is also likely to erode his limited popular support. [redacted]

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We believe Vieira's fate will ultimately rest with two key officials, Defense Minister Camara and Gen. Jose Marques Vieira. Camara, who commands the loyalty of the troops, probably could mount a successful coup should he decide to do so. We have no information on



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## Burundi: Church-State Frictions

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President Bagaza's obsession with an alleged threat from the influential Catholic Church to his 10-year-old left-leaning Tutsi minority regime continues to grow, according to US Embassy reporting. Some 69 percent of Burundi's 4.8 million people are Catholic, and mainly members of the predominant Hutu tribe. The church has emerged as the sole, if limited, dissenting voice in Burundi, the Embassy observes. Although the church is unlikely to challenge Bagaza directly, it will probably continue to quietly press for greater respect for human rights and draw attention to the regime's harsh repression of alleged opposition.



Jean Baptiste Bagaza  
President of Burundi

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President Bagaza and regime hardliners, such as Interior Minister Kazatsa, believe the Catholic Church may spark rebellion among the Hutu population against his government.<sup>1</sup> According to US Embassy reporting, Bagaza fears the church is raising a new generation of Hutu political leaders, although we have no evidence of such activity. A review of Embassy reporting also indicates that Bagaza resents the clergy's power base in the countryside, where it provides essential social services, such as health clinics and schools. The US Embassy reports that church attendance has increased in the last few years, probably in reaction to the government's anticleric campaign.

*Fears church is competing for mantle of leadership... blames Catholic missionaries for spread of colonialism in Africa... reportedly has refused to allow his children to be baptized.*

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became Burundi's sole political party in 1966. During the massacres in 1972—in which the ruling Tutsi government killed as many as 100,000 Hutus—the regime falsely accused the clergy of “stoking the flames” of insurrection. Bujumbura banned open-air prayer meetings in rural areas in 1979 for fear the church was growing too powerful among the Hutus, according to the US Embassy. According to open sources, some 200 foreign missionaries were expelled from Burundi between 1972 and 1982.

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Successive Burundi governments have accused the church of meddling in politics and fueling tribal animosities. According to academic studies, the church-state dispute dates back to the first days of independence, when missionaries publicly supported the conservative Christian Democratic Party in presidential elections. The party allegedly was involved in the 1961 assassination in 1961 of Prince Louis Rwagasore, the leader of UPRONA, which

Bagaza stepped up harassment of the church in 1984. According to the US Embassy and press reporting, the government stationed police at Catholic churches to record the names of people attending regular morning masses, banned religious meetings outside churches, prohibited worship between 0700 hours and 1700 hours on weekdays, removed all religious symbols, such as crucifixes, from public display, and

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<sup>1</sup> The Tutsis—some 15 percent of Burundi's population—have dominated political power since independence. According to US Embassy reporting, ethnic tensions permeate Burundi society, and the Hutus, who make up some 85 percent of the population, have only nominal representation in the government.

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**The Catholic Church in Africa**

Catholicism is one of the rapidly growing religions on the subcontinent, gaining more than 2 million converts annually. Of Africa's 500 million people, some 150 million are Muslim, while about 70 million are Catholic, another 70 million belong to other Christian denominations, and the remainder are animists. Vatican officials call Africa a "key battleground" for evangelism and estimate church membership will grow to some 100 million by the year 2000—18 percent of the continent's population, compared with 1 percent in 1900. According to US Embassy reporting, in many African states Catholic missionaries run schools and health clinics in the countryside, where government influence remains marginal. The Pope—who has toured Africa three times since 1979—so far has permitted the "Africanization of Christianity," which is a process of incorporating traditional cultural values and tribal practices into worship to gain adherents. The Pope has expressed concern that "liberation theology" could take root in Africa—as it has in Latin America—and African Catholics could become unwitting allies of Marxist revolutions, [redacted]

A number of African regimes regard the Catholic Church as a potential source of opposition, and some have actively persecuted local Catholic officials. In the early 1970s, Benin's President Kerekou nationalized church schools, expelled missionaries, and imprisoned a number of native priests in the belief that they opposed his imposition of a Marxist state. In Zimbabwe, Catholic Church leaders have persistently criticized human rights abuses in Matabeleland. In Zaire, President Mobutu has occasionally lashed out at Catholic missionaries for subversion, and, in 1981, a pastoral letter read at a bishops' conference in Kinshasa denounced official corruption and accused Mobutu of human rights abuses. Perhaps the most extreme case of religious persecution was in Equatorial Guinea under the brutal Macias regime (1968-79). In 1978, the Catholic Church was banned, Equatorial Guinea was declared the first atheist state in Africa, and the President, who regarded the church as a dissident power base, declared "There is no other God than Macias." [redacted]

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banned radiobroadcasts of Sunday mass. Bagaza claimed he had to take these actions because the time used for religious purposes would be better spent at "nation building," according to the Embassy. [redacted]

Sporadic crackdowns have continued since 1985. According to US Embassy reporting, Bujumbura has arbitrarily expelled foreign missionaries by not renewing their resident permits and claiming that they seek to impose "non-Burundian" ideas. Open-source reporting indicates that some 140 of the estimated 450 foreign missionaries in the country were expelled last year. Moreover, priests are periodically arrested and imprisoned for several months, probably in an attempt to intimidate them.

[redacted] since June military chaplains have been prohibited from holding services at government installations. [redacted]

The Catholic Church, nevertheless, persists in occasionally criticizing Bagaza's rule. Last August the bishops issued a pastoral letter denouncing the government's political and religious persecution.

[redacted] in 1985 a dissident church organization—the Marial Movement, founded by Jesuit priest Gabriel Barakana, former rector of the University of Burundi—published an antigovernment tract. The government arrested its leaders, and last December the 75-year-old Barakana and four others were found guilty of subversion and sentenced to five years in prison. Moreover, [redacted]

[redacted] last June a Catholic organization—the Congregation of Brothers of Bene Yozepu, which consists of about 300 friars—wrote a

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private letter to Bagaza deploring human rights violations, economic decline, and the regime's efforts to reduce the Catholic Church's influence.

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The government also persecutes members of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The refusal of church members to perform work on Saturday, their sabbath, led to the closure of their churches and loss of legal status in 1985, according to US Embassy reporting. The country's 55,000 Adventists—almost all of whom are Hutus—have been regularly harassed by local officials, and members occasionally have been arrested and charged with spreading “tribal hatred.” The Embassy also reports that the group is regarded by Marxist government officials as an “American” church that is not loyal to Bagaza. [redacted]

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#### Outlook

The ruling Tutsi regime in Bujumbura almost certainly will continue to selectively harass the Catholic Church, and expel foreign missionaries it regards as regime opponents. To weaken the influence of the church and lessen its ability to oppose the government, a review of US Embassy reporting suggests that Bagaza may ultimately plan to establish a “national” church along Communist lines, under which the government would have direct control over church property and funding. He probably would implement such a policy gradually so as not to anger key European donors—such as France and Belgium—whose economic assistance he needs. For its part, the Catholic bishops will probably continue passively to resist Bagaza's efforts to intimidate them, occasionally draw attention to his human rights abuses, and perhaps seek the Pope's intervention.

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## Africa Briefs

### South Africa

#### KwaNdebele Refuses Independence

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KwaNdebele's rejection this month of a plan that would have made it South Africa's fifth nominally "independent" homeland deals a severe blow to the government's independent homelands policy. KwaNdebele, with a population of 500,000, is the homeland for the Ndebele tribe, but is little more than a dormitory for workers in the Pretoria-Johannesburg area, according to US Embassy and press reporting. Pretoria had made the independence deal attractive by transferring land from the neighboring Lebowa homeland in January despite strong protests from Lebowa residents.

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President Botha's announcement in May that KwaNdebele would become independent in December—a move the homeland's leaders had agreed to in 1984—sparked an outbreak of violence that to date has left more than 100 dead. A two-week strike by civil servants, school boycotts, and violent clashes between pro- and anti-independence forces led Pretoria to impose severe emergency restrictions on the homeland in July. Residents claimed that pro-independence vigilantes—led by KwaNdebele Minister of Internal Affairs Ntuli—had conducted a reign of terror, burning houses and abducting political opponents, according to press reports. Ntuli's assassination in late July sparked celebrations throughout the homeland.

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Although Pretoria publicly announced that it will respect the KwaNdebele government's decision, President Botha recently reaffirmed the South African Government's intention to pursue its homelands policy, and again called on the international community to recognize Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, and Ciskei—homelands that have already accepted "independence." Pretoria also may attempt to challenge KwaNdebele's decision under homeland law.

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Whatever Pretoria's decision, however, the failure of KwaNdebele's leaders—handpicked by Pretoria—to follow through with independence is a serious embarrassment to the government, in our judgment. The government is likely to try to shift blame to "radical elements" that it claims are behind the current round of nationwide violence, but other homeland leaders may become even more reluctant to risk dealing with Pretoria out of fear of a strong popular backlash.

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**Secret****Africa****Insect Plagues Worsen** 

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The insect situation has worsened during the last 30 days, according to reporting from US Embassies and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The most critical areas are along the Sudan-Ethiopia border, the Mali-Mauritania border, and throughout Chad and Senegal. Southern Africa's insect problems also will increase during the region's rainy season of October-November. FAO's inability to supervise African locust control as thoroughly as it has in the past has contributed to the inadequacy of control efforts this year. We believe insects will be a problem for at least 5 more years—even if control measures improve in 1987. Food shortages will probably appear in late 1986 or early 1987, particularly in the Sahel and the Horn, but aid delivery systems developed during the recent famine should help limit starvation. The protracted nature of the plagues, their extent, and the need for additional supplies to combat insects all will contribute to a final monetary cost and most likely will exceed that of the famine.

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**Chronology of Islamic Activities in Nigeria**

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1 January–31 July 1986

**2 February**

President Babangida inaugurates a panel of 20 representatives from both Muslim and Christian society to examine the implications of Nigeria's controversial membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), according to press reports.

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US Embassy reports rumors that "recent crimes" in Niger State were committed by the Islamic Maitatsine sect.

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**19 April**

The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs issues a communique after its meeting in Kaduna criticizing the organizers of the all-Nigerian Conference on Foreign Policy for failing to invite the council, but allowing the rival Christian Association of Nigeria to attend. The council urges the Federal Military Government to announce a final decision on Nigeria's membership in the OIC, and condemns the United States for its bombing of Libya, according to US Embassy reporting.

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**24 April**

Kaduna Polytechnic campus closes for 10 days after a demonstration by militant members of the Muslim Student Society protesting unspecified "unIslamic" activities planned for the student spring festivals. One person reported dead and several students hospitalized, according to US Embassy reporting.

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[Redacted]

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**5 May**

Armed members of the Muslim Student Society demonstrate at Bayero University and the University of Sokoto protesting "obscene and anti-Islamic activities," leaving 15 people injured, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

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**19 July**

Nigerian pilgrims leaving from Lagos and Kano for Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to make the hajj. Some 20,000 Nigerians are expected to make the pilgrimage, according to US Embassy reporting. [Redacted]

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